The Moral Choice is the Only Choice
The concepts of morality and freedom appear contradictory. How can one act freely when there is only one moral action to take? Yet Kant asserts that a moral action and a free action are “one and the same” in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Through the analysis of common moral philosophy, Kant demonstrates that morality and freedom need each other to function. When one wills something under moral laws, the maxim that guides their action needs to be made autonomously, or else we cannot judge its moral worth. Similarly, when one makes a free decision, one requires others to be moral to ensure that their decision is made according to their goals and interests, so as to not be deceived. Therefore, the two concepts are intimately related and cannot work without the other. Ultimately, Kant’s claim is persuasive because deriving our wills solely from moral standards creates a system of trust that allows for freer decision-making.
To better understand Kant’s argument that a will under moral laws and a free will are internally related, we need to understand the concept of the Categorical Imperative and how it derives the idea of autonomy, which links the two concepts. The Categorical Imperative (CI) is a command that we must follow, regardless of our desires, because it is our moral obligation (4:417). It defines morality because it is done without end goals or consideration for the result, so the good is contained only in the person’s intention. An example is me holding the door for someone out of duty and not because I want to feel good, which is an example of a Hypothetical Imperative that contains an end goal. Kant’s humanity formulation, or explanation, for the CI brings the idea of autonomy to light. The formula demands us to respect others’ humanity and see each of them with their own interests, goals, values, etc (4:429). The most common example that violates this idea is the act of lying. If you ask for money from your parents to buy textbooks but instead buy a video game, you have treated your parents as a mere means to get money and neglected their interests, like for you to be better educated. By ignoring your parents’ interests, you have negatively influenced their decision-making, therefore compromising their ability to make decisions autonomously.
The idea of autonomy is also found in freedom. Kant asserts that freedom is not lawlessness but the ability to legislate laws for ourselves. To prove this, he uses the idea that causation implies universal regularity (4:447). If X causes Y, then there is some universally valid law connecting Xs to Ys. For instance, I feel exhausted after I exercise. Exercise, then, causes exhaustion according to some biological law. Similarly, my willing leads to action, so there is some universal law connecting the two. It cannot be a natural law because they do not govern the operation of my will. Thus, he concludes that the will is a law in itself because the action conforms to the will, where we are the creators of the law. Kant calls this property of the will being a law to itself “autonomy.” We can see, then, the way that a free will operates is much like the way a will under moral law operates in that both need autonomously derived maxims.
Kant’s argument is persuasive because autonomy is a core component of the well-functioning of each will. For instance, a person under physical or psychological threat cannot make a moral choice. So, if he lies to someone, the moral worth of his action cannot be judged fairly. Here, we can see morality requires free will, or the ability to legislate our own law independently, to function. Similarly, free will cannot operate well if others are not acting in accordance with moral laws. If my goal is to purchase a car without issues but the car dealer sold it to me having lied about its faulty engine, then I did not achieve my goal, nor could I ever achieve it if every car dealer lied about their cars. Thus, my freedom to purchase a good car becomes limited. We can see, then, that the morality of others is a requirement for me to freely satisfy my wants.
In a critique of Kant, a Libertarian would raise the objection that alternative choices are important to look at in deciding a moral action. However, it falls short because doing something other than the morally valid choice creates inconsistencies that would cause morality to deteriorate. The Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) in libertarianism states that “a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise” (Robb). Several issues arise from this view. Say that lying about the location of another person to save their life is good. When is lying justified? Can I justify my lie for a morally “bad” goal? Kant, then, would argue that the libertarian idea of morality leads to natural dialectics, or moral corruption, opening up the door to immoral actions and creating an inconsistency in morality that would cause morality itself to cease. This is why Kant is opposed to taking a consequentialist view in forming his CI because external events are unpredictable. As long as the universally valid choice is made, there can be no blame on the agent. Thus, the Libertarian objection fails.
In conclusion, Kant’s argument that acting freely and acting in accordance with moral laws are the same is persuasive because it creates a consistent moral code that upholds both our freedom and morality. The fact that we can only make the moral choice is not restrictive because it allows for greater freedom for us to achieve our goals and interests. Without a strict moral standard, members of society would cease to respect each other’s humanity and use each other as mere means, causing the disintegration of morality entirely. So, humanity would benefit from pursuing a Kantian version of morality.
Works Cited:
Robb, David, “Moral Responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/alternative-possibilities.
